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ON LAW AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT: 
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY 
Daan Braveman • 
Richard E. D. "Red" Schwartz has been a colleague and mentor for 
over a quarter of a century, and it is with great pleasure that I participate 
in this celebration of him and his work. The theme of the conference is 
most appropriate for the celebration. Red has devoted his career to an 
examination of the role of law in the development of societies. 
Moreover, Red's work on law and society has reached far beyond his 
extraordinary academic and scholarly achievements, extending as well 
to his important and significant contributions to the improvement of 
local, national, and international communities. Many years ago, Red 
organized a lunchtime reading group at the University to discuss the 
meaning of a "just society." It is most fair to say that Red has devoted 
his life not only to an academic understanding of such a society, but 
also to practical efforts to establish that society. 
I was asked to comment on the topic of the conference as it relates 
to the United States. It is not simply my law background that persuaded 
me to focus on the issue of judicial supremacy. Examination of law and 
democracy in the United States at some point must tum its attention to 
the role of the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, in furthering 
democratic principles. A fundamental · aspect of our democratic 
experience has been the institution of judicial review, the proposition 
that unelected, life-tenured judges have the power to declare that our 
elected representatives have acted unconstitutionally. 1 This is a 
remarkable power even if perhaps tempered by the fact that the 
judiciary lacks the power of the purse or the sword and, thus, cannot 
enforce its decisions.2 
What role should the judiciary and the countermajoritarian 
institution of judicial review play in a democracy? Must we (the 
people) and our elected representatives comply with a judicial 
interpretation of the constitution that we believe is itself inconsistent 
with the fundamental law? Or, are we free to ignore judicial decisions 
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1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch)137, 177-78 (1803). 
2. See DAAN BRA VEMAN, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LA w: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN 
OUR FEDERAL SYSTEMS 168 (4th ed. 2000) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander 
Hamilton)); ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 69-70 (1962). 
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that we believe are illegitimate? These, of course, are not new questions 
but ones that have been debated over the course of our history. In this 
brief commentary, I can only introduce some of the issues surrounding 
the current debate over these questions. 
To place the matter in context, consider the following problem. In 
1989, the Supreme Court held in Stanford v. Kentucky that the state did 
not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment by executing juveniles.3 Only 16 years later, a closely 
divided Supreme Court reversed that decision and held in Roper v. 
Simmons that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a state from imposing 
the death penalty on a juvenile offender under the age of 18 years.4 The 
Roper case involved the state of Missouri and, under preclusion rules, 
the judgment did not apply to the other 19 states that authorize the 
juvenile death penalty. 5 Suppose the other states maintain that the 
earlier decision in Stanford more accurately interpreted the constitution. 
Are these other states free to execute juveniles until a court rules that 
their laws are unconstitutional, or are they bound by Roper to stop the 
practice? 
Recently, these kinds of questions are receiving considerable 
attention as a number of scholars advocate some version of the idea of 
"popular constitutionalism."6 Professor Larry Kramer, author of The 
People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 
defines popular constitutionalism as a system in which the people have 
"active and ongoing control over the interpretation and enforcement of 
constitutional law."7 Under this system, the "authority to interpret and 
enforce the Constitution is not deposited exclusively or ultimately in the 
courts (or in any agency of government, for that matter), but remains in 
politics and with 'the people themselves. "'8 In contrast, judicial 
supremacy, or what Kramer refers to as "legal constitutionalism," places 
final authority to interpret and enforce the Constitution in the judiciary.9 
One of the strongest statements of judicial supremacy is the 
3. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
4. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
5. As a general proposition, preclusion rules can apply only against a party to a prior 
proceeding. See Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971). 
6. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959 (2004) (reviewing 
the extensive scholarly literature on the questions raised in this article). 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 961 n.3. 
9. Id. at 959. See generally Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997). 
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Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v. Aaron. Io There, Arkansas 
officials urged that the Court uphold a suspension of the Little Rock 
School Board's plan to desegregate the public schools while state 
officials pursued efforts to ignore and nullify the holding in Brown v. 
Board of Education. I I The Court in Cooper described the case as 
involving "a claim by a Governor and Legislature of a State that there is 
no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this 
Court's considered interpretation of the United States Constitution."I2 A 
unanimous Court forcefully rejected any suggestion that state officials 
are free to ignore the decisions of the Supreme Court and engage in 
such a "war against the Constitution."I3 The Court held that when state 
officials take an oath to support the Constitution, they bind themselves 
to the Court's interpretations of the Constitution. I4 Quoting Chief 
Justice Marshall, the Court said: '"If the legislatures of the several states 
may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and 
destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself 
becomes a solemn mockery. rnIS 
Arkansas was not one of the states involved in Brown and was not 
bound by the judgment in that case under preclusion rules. 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the Arkansas officials were 
bound in a deeper sense by Brown, reasoning as follows: (1) under the 
Supremacy Clause, I6 the Constitution is the supreme law of the land; (2) 
Marbury declared that it is the duty of the judiciary to interpret the 
Constitution;I 7 (3) therefore, the judiciary's interpretations of the 
Constitution are the supreme law of the land as well and bind officials 
who are sworn to uphold the Constitution. Is Justice Frankfurter 
explained in his concurring opinion that any other conclusion would 
destroy the rule of law. 
[T]he Founders knew that Law alone saves a society from being rent 
by internecine strife or ruled by mere brute power however 
disguised .... The conception of a government by laws dominated the 
thoughts of those who founded this Nation and designed its 
10. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
11. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
12. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4. 
13. Id. at 18. 
14. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
15. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 (quoting United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. 115, 136 (1809)). 
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
17. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
18. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. 
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Constitution, although they knew as well as the belittlers of the 
conception that laws have to be made, interpreted and enforced by 
men. To that end, they set apart a body of men, who were to be the 
depositories of law, who by their disciplined training and character 
and by withdrawal from the usual temptations of private interest may 
reasonably be expected to be 'as free, impartial, and independent as 
the lot of humanity will admit.' So strongly were the framers of the 
Constitution bent on securing a reign of law that they endowed the 
judicial office with extraordinary safeguards and prestige. No one, no 
matter how exalted his public office or how righteous his private 
motive, can be judge in his own case. That is what courts are for. 19 
Thirty years later, Attorney General Edwin Meese gave a speech 
that attacked Cooper's reliance on the notion of judicial supremacy. In 
his controversial remarks, he too invoked the rule of law, but used it to 
support the proposition that the supreme law of the land is the 
Constitution itself, rather than the constitutional law announced in 
Supreme Court interpretations of the document. 
Obviously constitutional decisions are binding on the parties to a case; 
but the implication of the [Cooper] dictum that everyone should accept 
constitutional decisions uncritically, that they are judgments from 
which there is no appeal, was astonishing .... In one fell swoop, the 
Court seemed to reduce the Constitution to the status of ordinary 
constitutional law, and to equate the judge with the lawgiver .... The 
logic of the dictum in Cooper v. Aaron was, and is, at war with the 
Constitution, at war with the basic principles of democratic 
government, and at war with the very meaning of the rule oflaw .... 
Perhaps no one has ever put it better than did Abraham Lincoln, 
seeking to keep the lamp of freedom burning bright in the dark moral 
shadows cast by the Court in the Dred Scott case. Recognizing that 
Justice Taney, in his opinion in that case, had done great violence not 
only to the text of the Constitution but to the intentions of those who 
had written, proposed, and ratified it, Lincoln argued that if the policy 
of government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be 
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court the instant they 
are made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in personal actions, 
the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that 
extent, practically resigned their government into the hands of that 
19. United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 308-09 (1947) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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imminent tribunal. 20 
Meese concluded that we must preserve the distinction between the 
Constitution and judicial interpretations of the Constitution, recognizing 
that it is the former that is superior. Meese warned that "[t]o do 
otherwise, as Lincoln said, is to submit to government by judiciary. But 
such a state could never be consistent with the principles of our 
Constitution. Indeed, it would be utterly inconsistent with the very idea 
of the rule of law to which we, as a people, have always subscribed."21 
As might be expected, Meese's position provoked sharp criticisms.22 
Anthony Lewis summarized the view of the critics when he wrote, '"To 
argue ... that no one owes respect to a Supreme Court decision unless 
he was actually a party to the case-is to invite anarchy. "'23 It is 
interesting to note that Meese eventually retreated from his position, 
explaining that he did not mean to suggest that Supreme Court decisions 
are not generally applicable.24 
The current proponents of popular constitutionalism, however, 
have refocused attention on the issue and appear to join Meese in 
challenging the notion of judicial supremacy. It makes for strange 
bedfellows as the political progressives of today advocate views similar 
to those of the politically conservative Meese. It may be tempting to 
conclude that the debate between advocates of popular constitutionalism 
and those of judicial supremacy is not about deep theory but rather 
about outcomes. If you like the Supreme Court decisions, you argue for 
judicial supremacy. If you disagree with the Court's outcomes, you 
argue against the proposition that the Court's decisions have a general 
applicability outside the specific parties to the case. Such a conclusion, 
however, is not fair to any of the participants in the debate. 
Kramer critiques each of the classic justifications for judicial 
supremacy and concludes that the arguments rest on controversial 
empirical assumptions and facts that can not be tested or proved. 25 He 
agrees with others who maintain that ultimately the differences between 
the popular constitutionalists and the judicial supremacists tum on 
fundamental views about democracy. Underlying the judicial 
20. Edwin Meese, Perspective on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decision: 
The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 987-89 (1987). 
21. Id. at 989. 
22. See DAAN BRA VEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 50. 
23. Id. 
24. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 964. 
25. Id. at 1002. 
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supremacy model, he argues, is a distrust of democracy, a view that 
"ordinary politics is too dangerous to permit without some independent 
body to control its excesses and injustices."26 He concludes that: 
the choice between popular constitutionalism and judicial 
supremacy . . . is necessarily and unavoidably one for the American 
people to make. The Constitution does not make the choice for us. 
Neither does history or tradition or law. We may choose ... to 
surrender control to the Court, to make it our platonic guardian for 
defining constitutional values. Or we may choose to keep this 
responsibility, even while leavin9 the Court as our agent to make 
decisions. Either way, we decide.2 
Critics have attacked Kramers' brand of popular constitutionalism 
and his notion that Supreme Court decisions should be binding on only 
the parties to the cases. Laurence Tribe, for example, argues that 
Kramer's reliance on history is misplaced, finding that "Kramer's 
picture of popular constitutionalism from the founding to the mid-20th 
century is as misleading as it is foreshortened."28 More significantly, the 
view that the constitution means whatever the "people" say at any given 
time ignores the very purposes of a constitution. Tribe wrote: 
if constitutional law were but a vessel into which the people could 
pour whatever they wanted it to contain at any given moment, 
wouldn't the whole point of framing a constitution have been lost? A 
constitution announces the "promises to keep" that define who we are. 
"The people" whose promises a written constitution makes cannot be 
frozen in a snapshot-much less a snapshot taken today.29 
Erwin Chemerinsky offers additional criticisms of popular 
constitutionalism. First, he maintains that Kramer relies on arguments 
that are abstract at best, failing to explain what he means when he says 
that final constitutional interpretative authority lies with the people.30 
Second, and perhaps more significantly, Chemerinsky suggests that 
26. Id. at 1004. 
27. Id. at 1011. 
28. Laurence H. Tribe, The People's Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, § 7. 
29. Id. 
30. Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 
92 CAL. L. REv. 1013, 1014-18 (2004). See also Larry Alexander & Lawrence Solum, 
Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1616 (2005). 
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Kramer's version of popular constitutionalism is dangerous because it 
leaves protection of minority interests to the whim of the majority. The 
absence of judicial supremacy forecloses "judicial protection for 
litigants who have nowhere to turn but the courts-litigants who are, by 
definition, unable to harness 'popular' authority for their own 
constitutional interests. "31 
For our discussion today, I want to suggest that the division 
between popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy may be 
overstated. There is a substantial role for the "people" even under a 
judicial supremacy model that recognizes the binding impact of 
Supreme Court decisions beyond the parties to the case.32 Acting 
through their political representatives, the people, of course, can amend 
the Constitution to reject a Supreme Court interpretation. The 
amendment process may be appropriately burdensome but it 
nevertheless is an available means for expressing the will of the 
people.33 So too, the politically responsive branches can use the 
appointment process to alter the composition of the Court, thereby 
producing changes in constitutional interpretations. 
The people also exercise indirect, but quite effective, influence on 
the Court. As others have argued, the empirical data indicate that the 
Court is attuned to public opinion and its decisions are usually 
consistent with strong majorities.34 Moreover, the Court uses self-
restraint to avoid deciding issues that, for the time, are better left to the 
political branches for resolution. As Professor Bickel noted, the Court 
can-and does-deny certiorari and invokes doctrines like standing, 
ripeness, and political question as ways to postpone decision on 
politically controversial issues. 35 
Perhaps most important, however, when the Supreme Court 
renders a decision on a politically sensitive issue it does not necessarily 
31. Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 1014. 
32. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, 
and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2004) ("we do not understand judicial 
supremacy and popular constitutionalism to be mutually exclusive systems of constitutional 
ordering .... They are in fact dialectically interconnected and have long coexisted."). 
33. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XI (rejecting Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 
419 (1793) holding States could be compelled to defend themselves in the courts of the 
United States); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); For arguments that the people can 
amend the Constitution outside the Article V process, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 
( 1991 ); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside 
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994). 
34. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 970 n. 42 (listing the articles cited by the author). 
35. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 132-33. 
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end the ongoing discussion about that issue. Indeed, to the contrary, the 
decision is better perceived as generating a dialogue with the political 
branches of government and the people. That dialogue, observed 
Herbert Wechsler, "concerns the adequacy of the reasons it advances for 
the value choices that it decrees."36 Louis Fisher and Neal Devins 
stressed the importance of this ongoing dialogue and the role of the 
other branches of government in constitutional interpretation when they 
wrote: 
Constitutions draw their life from a variety of sources that operate 
outside the courts: ideas, customs, social pressures, and the constant 
dialogue that takes place among political institutions. Just as the 
judiciary leaves its mark on society, so does society drive the agenda 
and decisions of the courts. Justice Cardozo reminded us that the 
'great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not tum aside 
in their course and pass the judges by. '37 
The decision in Roe v. Wade, for example, plainly was not the final 
pronouncement on the abortion issue.38 Even assuming nonparties were 
subject to the precise holding of Roe, there was plenty of room for 
continued opposition by arguing that Roe did not address a variety of 
specific issues. The people of Connecticut expressed their opposition to 
Roe v. Wade by authorizing Medicaid reimbursement for medical 
expenses incidental to childbirth but not for nontherapeutic abortions. 
The Supreme Court upheld the state law, concluding that Roe v. Wade 
did not prevent the state from making a value judgment that favors 
childbirth over abortion. 39 While the funding decision had a profound 
practical impact on the ability of the poor to exercise their right under 
Roe, the Court found that the State might influence a woman's decision 
by making childbirth a more attractive alternative. Similarly, the Court 
subsequently upheld the federal government's decision to deny public 
funding for medically necessary abortions.40 In doing so, it observed 
that "[ w ]hether freedom of choice that is constitutionally protected 
36. Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1013 
(1965). 
37. LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 
(2d ed. 1996) (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 
(1921)). 
38. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 
1199 (1992). 
39. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
40. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
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warrants federal subsidization is a question for Congress to answer, not 
a matter if constitutional entitlement."41 
States also responded by imposing a number of restrictions 
designed to limit the availability of abortions. In Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey,42 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the core principle of Roe. At the 
same time, however, it upheld the state restrictions on the right, 
including a requirement that a minor obtain parental or guardian 
approval for an abortion. It also upheld the state's mandate that at least 
24 hours before performing an abortion a doctor inform a patient of the 
health risks of an abortion, the nature of the procedure, the age of the 
fetus, and the availability of material regarding medical assistance for 
childbirth. 
It might be argued that Chief Justice Rehnquist was correct when 
he observed that the Court retained the "outer shell of Roe, but beat[] a 
wholesale retreat from the substance of that case."43 The point here, 
however, is not to examine the continuing vitality of Roe but to 
illustrate the effect of the ongoing dialogue about the abortion issue.44 
Justice (then Judge) Ginsburg captured the significance of such a 
dialogue when she stressed that judges are not alone in shaping legal 
doctrine but rather "participate in a dialo&ue with the other organs of 
government, and with the people as well. "4 
If viewed in this manner, the judicial supremacists and the popular 
constitutionalists might not be as split as the rhetoric suggests. A 
Supreme Court interpretation might well be treated as binding on 
officials sworn to uphold the Constitution, even if they are not parties to 
the specific case. At the same time, however, that decision does not 
prevent an ongoing dialogue about the wisdom of the interpretation, a 
dialogue that recognizes the role of the people and the political branches 
and one that could lead to a change in the very constitutional 
determination. 
41. Id. at318. 
42. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
43. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
44. The abortion controversy is just one of the many examples of such a dialogue 
among the Court, the political branches, and the people. Other prominent examples include 
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954). 
45. Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 1198. 
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